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Abstract: This work has the purpose to highlight the different interpretation of cyber security between 
Euro-Atlantic partners and the Sino-Russian world. On grounds of this, we can realise how alternative 
their stance on the global scenario is. In fact, in the last years the NATO Alliance has been accusing 
Moscow of steadily violating international agreements, thus jeopardising regional stability and democ-
ratic processes through the collaboration with cyber criminals. On the other hand, the Russians and the 
Chinese have been cooperating on several questions, including control of the Web and contrast to terror-
ism and any kind of extremism in the cyber domain. According to such an approach, the Net is an exten-
sion of the physical territory of an independent State. Therefore, the Executive has the right to safeguard 
its sovereignty and protect the nation’s ways of life and core values. This is why Russia has not signed the 
Budapest Convention of Cybercrime, which claims that a contracting Party may give access or receive 
stored computer data located elsewhere, without authorisation of another Party. In a few words, we can 
state that the Cold War has moved to the Internet.        
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Introduction 
 
Cyber threat is extremely complex, constantly evolving around transnational criminal 
organisations, and affecting cyber attacks, that is web activities carried out through a 
system of information instructions. Illicit activities in the virtual world are typically as-
sociated with the “Dark Web,” a sub-set of the Internet where IP addresses of websites 
are concealed. Here, the sale of drugs, weapons, counterfeit documents and child por-
nography have literally become flourishing industries
1
. According to the latest Europol 
Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA), in some EU countries police re-
ports dealing with cyber crime have by now overcome those relating to traditional 
criminality. What is interesting in the IOCTA report is the width of cyber crime geo-
graphic distribution, allowing any sort of criminal organisation to exploit the Net all 
over the planet.  
                                                          
* TA4eae 
1
 See A. GREENBERG, Hacker Lexicon: What Is the Dark Web?, in «Wired», November 19, 2014, in 
http://www.wired.com. 
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     As concerns Africa, the  most commonly reported threats seem to be social engineer-
ing attacks and cyber-facilitated frauds, due to the fact that this continent hosts nearly 
ten per cent of the world’s Internet users, though almost one third of African countries 
enjoy less than one tenth of Internet penetration.
2
 In North America, instead, despite an 
Internet penetration of over eighty-eight per cent, there is a smaller percentage of users 
than in Africa, that is only 8.6 per cent. Nevertheless, this part of the world is a key tar-
get for financially motivated cyber crime, in terms of frauds and data breaching, number 
of records stolen and average cost per breach, as well as being identified as a primary 
origin of children being featured in imagery abuse. As regards Asia, here there are over 
half of the world’s web users, but despite this the continent is the focus for a dispropor-
tionately small percentage of cyber threats. Countries in Asia do however feature heav-
ily as victims of cyber crime, and many of them, such as India, Taiwan, Malaysia, South 
Korea and Pakistan, also feature the highest rates of attacked computers. Concerning the 
EU, it is perhaps unsurprising that the majority of threats are identified as coming from 
within Europe, especially those dealing with social engineering, Internet-facilitated sex-
ual offences against children, malware, and attacks on critical infrastructure. Eastern 
Europe, instead, is reported as a key source of ATM malware. Russia is also reportedly 
home to a number of  advanced persistent threat attack groups.
3
 
     Aiming at bridging differences among EU countries and reaching a minimum secu-
rity level for technology and digital services, the European Commission adopted its own 
cyber security strategy in 2013. Such a document highlighted five priorities, that is to 
say: a) achieving cyber resilience; b) drastically reducing cyber crime; c) developing 
                                                          
2
 In 2014, the African Union adopted the Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection, 
inviting all States to establish all appropriate measures aiming at cyber security governance and combat-
ing cyber crime. See African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection, 
Adopted by the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session of the Assembly, Held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, 27 
June 2014, in https://au.int; to make the implementation of the Convention easier, in 2017 the African 
Union Commission developed guidelines to put forward Internet security principles, tailoring everything 
to the African cyber security features, that is a shortage of skilled human resources, limited financial re-
sources, limited levels of awareness of cyber security issues among stakeholders, and a general lack of 
awareness of the risks involved. See Internet Infrastructure Security Guidelines for Africa: A Joint Initia-
tive of the Internet Society and the Commission of the African Union, May 30, 2017, in 
https://www.internetsociety.org.     
3
 See EUROPOL, EUROPEAN CYBERCRIME CENTRE, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) 
2017, in www.europol.europa.eu. 
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cyber defence policy and capabilities; d) developing industrial and technological re-
sources for cyber security; e) establishing a coherent international cyber space policy 
and promoting core EU values. In order to implement these policies, both public authori-
ties and the private sector must develop capabilities and cooperate effectively through a 
cross-border dimension, also exploring possibilities on how the EU and NATO could 
complement their efforts. Finally, a critical point which has by now become a source of 
controversy with Russia and China was the paragraph stating that preserving open, free 
and secure cyber space would always be a global challenge. In light of this, the Com-
mission undertook to seek to promote openness and freedom of the Internet, encourage 
efforts to develop norms of behaviour and apply existing international laws in cyber 
space, being always led by EU core values of human dignity, freedom, democracy, and 
respect for fundamental rights. Hence, the documents stated the necessity to provide 
analysis and intelligence, support investigations, facilitate cooperation, and create chan-
nels for information sharing among the competent authorities in the member States.
4
 
Within this frame, two years later the Commission highlighted the need for a strong EU 
response to terrorism. At the same time, serious and organised cross-border crime was 
finding new avenues to operate, such as trafficking in human beings, trade in firearms, 
drug smuggling, and financial, economic and environmental crime. In a few words, ter-
rorism, organised crime and cyber crime were regarded as three core priorities to face. 
Moreover, several directives provided national legislation to prevent child sexual abuse 
online.
5
 As an evidence of the collaboration between the European Union and the 
United States, on December 5, 2012, the Global Alliance Against Child Sexual Abuse 
Online was launched, aiming at raising standards worldwide and uniting efforts around 
the world to more effectively combat online sexual crimes against children. Gathering 
fifty-four countries, it is committed to pursue concrete actions in four key policy areas: 
                                                          
4
 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the Euro-
pean Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Cybersecurity Strategy of the 
European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, Brussels, February 7, 2013, JOIN (2013) 1 final, 
in https://eeas.europa.eu. 
5
 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the Euro-
pean Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The European Agenda on Secu-
rity, Strasbourg, April 28, 2015 COM (2015) 185 final, in www.cepol.europa.eu. 
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1) identifying victims in order for them to receive the necessary assistance, support and 
protection; 2) investigating cases of child sexual abuse online; 3) increasing awareness 
among children, parents, educators and the community at large about the risks; 4) reduc-
ing the availability of child pornography online and re-victimization of children.
6
  
     As concerns the United Nations, in 1998 Russia introduced a draft resolution on the 
developments in the field of information and communication. Since then, every year the 
General Assembly has always approved a resolution on that question. Moreover, on 
Russian request a Group of Government Experts (GGE) coming from fifteen members 
was established, with the purpose to produce proposals on an international level. The 
aim of this process was to build cooperation for a peaceful, secure, resilient and open 
cyber environment by agreeing upon rules and principles of responsible behaviour and 
exchange of information. The GGE issued a consensus report in 2010, recommending a 
series of steps to reduce the risk of misperception resulting from web and information 
disruptions, but did not forward any binding agreements.
7
 However, such a format is not 
without points of weakness, due first of all to the lack of binding Security Council Reso-
lutions, and then to the different approach of China and Russia, on one hand, and the 
United States on the other hand. In a few words, there is no shared interpretation on how 
international law may be implemented on cyber space. In September 2012, the U.S. 
State Department took a public position on whether cyber activities could constitute a 
use of force under the U.N. Charter and customary international law. According to Har-
old Koh, Department of State legal advisor during the Obama Administration, cyber ac-
tivities provoking death, injury, or significant destruction would likely be considered as 
a use of force. Koh focused his attention on the outcome of a cyber attack, rather than 
the means with which it would be carried out.
8
 However, the United States recognizes 
that cyber attacks without kinetic effects are also an element of armed conflict under 
certain circumstances, such as an attack on information networks in the course of an on-
                                                          
6
 See We Protect Global Alliance to End Child Sexual Exploitation Online, in https://ec.europa.eu. 
7
 See UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Develop-
ments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, July 
30, 2010, in www.un.org. 
8
 See C.A. THEOHARY - J.W. ROLLINS, Congressional Research Service Report - Cyberwarfare and Cy-
berterrorism: In Brief, March 27, 2015, R 43955, in https://fas.org. 
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going armed conflict, which would imply retaliation with a proportional use of kinetic 
force
9
. On the other hand, Russia and China introduced a revision of the UN interna-
tional code of conduct for information security, stressing the commitment for each State 
to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all, as well 
as respect for human rights and the difference of history, culture, and social systems of 
any country. What the representative of the Euro-Asian members wanted to underline 
was the appeal not to use information technology to interfere in the international affairs 
of other States, or to undermine their political, economic, and social stability.
10
  
 
1. The Convention of Budapest: A Comparison with Chinese Criminal Law  
     
The so-called Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, drafted by the Council of Europe in 
2001, is the first international document aiming at harmonising legislation on criminal 
activities online, being also open for ratification to non members of the Council of 
Europe. The Convention broadly attempts to cover crimes of illegal access, interference 
and interception of data and system networks, and the criminal misuse of devices, as 
well as computer-related fraud, production, distribution and transmission of child por-
nography and copyright offences. Aiming at a comparative study with non-Western 
powers’ initiatives, what is interesting to highlight is what is stated in articles nine, 
twenty-three, and thirty-two of the Convention. As concerns article nine, this is relating 
to child pornography offences, stating that each Party shall adopt such legislative and 
other measures on the following conduct: a) producing child pornography for the pur-
pose of its distribution through a computer system; b) offering or making available child 
pornography through a computer system; c) distributing or transmitting child pornogra-
phy through a computer system; d) procuring child pornography through a computer 
                                                          
9
 See International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security and Openness in a Networked World, 
May 2011, in https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. 
10
 See UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Letter Dated 9 January 2015 from the Permanent Repre-
sentatives of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the 
United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, Sixty-ninth Session, Agenda Item 91, Developments 
in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, January 13, 
2015, Distr.: General, A/69/723, in http://repository.un.org. 
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system for oneself or for another person; e) possessing child pornography in a computer 
system or on a computer-data storage medium.
11
 
     On the other hand, the relevant provisions in Chinese Criminal Law are regulated in 
Articles 363-367, defining the crime of producing, duplicating, publishing, selling or 
disseminating pornographic materials for the purpose of profit, and the crime of dis-
seminating pornographic materials.
12
 According to Pi Yong, Professor of Law at Wu-
ham University, People’s Republic of China, the offences related to child pornography 
of the Convention of Budapest do have differences with the same crime in Chinese 
Criminal Law.
13
 First of all, the criminal object of the Convention are child pornogra-
phy materials, so that the legislative purposes is to protect children against being used in 
sexual activities; the criminal object of the Chinese Criminal Law are pornography ma-
terials, including adult pornography materials as well as child pornography materials, so 
that the legislative purpose is to protect a good social environment. Moreover, while the 
Convention states that criminal conduct is producing, offering or making available, dis-
tributing or transmitting, procuring or possessing child pornography through a computer 
system,
14
 the Chinese code affirms that what is punishable is producing, duplicating, 
publishing, selling or disseminating pornographic materials. In addition to that, para-
graph 1 of Article 363 requires the purpose of making profit to convict the crime, so that 
the condition to establish this crime is stricter; the provision in the Convention only re-
quires the purpose of distributing child pornography materials through a computer sys-
tem to convict crime, while paragraph 1 of Article 364 requires that the circumstances 
of disseminating pornography materials be serious in order to convict the crime. From 
the comparison above, the outcome is that China lacks legislation against child pornog-
raphy crime, as the Chinese Criminal Law does not differentiate between child pornog-
                                                          
11
 See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, European Treaty Series No. 185, Convention on Cybercrime, Budapest, 23 
November 2001, in https://rm.coe.int. 
12
 See NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS, Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China No. 83, 
Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, March 14, 1997, in www.fmprc.gov. 
13
 See PI YONG, Comparative Research on “Convention on Cybercrime” and Chinese Relevant Legisla-
tion, in https://www.coe.int. 
14
 See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, European Treaty Series No. 185, Convention on Cybercrime, cit. 
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raphy crime and other crimes of producing, selling and disseminating pornography ma-
terials.
15
  
     Going back to the Convention of Budapest, the principle relating to international co-
operation is stated in article 23, calling the Parties to collaborate to the widest extent, to 
the purpose of investigation and collection of evidence of any electronic form of crimi-
nal offence.
16
 However, the reason why the Russian Federation is the only member of 
the Council of Europe which has not signed the Convention on cyber crime may be 
searched in the provisions of Article 32, saying that a Party may access open source 
computer data, regardless of where the data are geographically located, as well as giving 
access or receiving stored computer data located elsewhere, without authorisation of an-
other Party. In particular, Moscow finds this provision to be an intolerable infringement 
of State sovereignty. A key divergence with the Western approach to cyber security is 
the Russian perception of cyber space, which must be considered as an extension of the 
physical territory of an independent State, thus subject to government jurisdiction. 
Therefore, each country should have the right to control the Web the way they like. On 
the contrary, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) rec-
ommendations include free flow of information and knowledge, freedom of expression, 
association and assembly, protection of individual liberties,
17
 as also said by the British 
Foreign Secretary, William Hague, at the London International Conference on Cyber-
space on 1-2 November 2011.
18
  
     Nevertheless, a pivotal difference was expressed at the same conference by the Rus-
sian Minister Shchegolev, who underlined several limits to the principle of free flow of 
information, as this should be subject both to national legislation, and to counter-
terrorism considerations, thus giving priority to security interests.
19
 The question of 
                                                          
15
 See PI YONG, Comparative Research, cit. 
16
 See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, European Treaty Series No. 185, Convention on Cybercrime, cit. 
17
 See OECD Council Recommendation on Principles for Internet Policy Making, December 13, 2011, in 
www.oecd.org. 
18
 See W. HAGUE, London Conference on Cyberspace: Chair's Statement, November 2, 2011, in 
www.gov.uk. 
19
 See K. GILES, Russia’s Public Stance on Cyberspace Issues, in C. CZOSSECK - R. OTTIS - K. 
ZIOLKOWSKI, eds., 2012 4
th
 International Conference on Cyber Conflict, NATO CCD COE Publications, 
Tallin, 2012, p. 65. 
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Internet sovereignty is another big source of disagreement. As a matter of fact, Russia 
agrees with China on the idea of national control of all Internet resources that lie within 
a State’s physical border. This is in direct opposition to the approach of the United 
States, as expressed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in December 2011, when she 
clearly said that countries like Russia wished to empower each individual government to 
make their own rules for the Internet, thus undermining human rights and the free flow 
of information. The real intention behind such an approach, the Secretary stated, was to 
create national barriers in cyber space, which was exactly the opposite of Internet free-
dom.
20
 Another pivotal field of divergence are the concept of terrorism, with a particular 
focus on what constitutes cyber terrorism, and the issue of access to a foreign State’s in-
formation space, which stresses the dissent towards Article 32 of the Council of Europe 
Convention on Cybercrime. The statement “without the authorisation of another Party” 
for the Russians is an intolerable breach in the principle of sovereignty. Russian con-
cerns are illustrated through a report in the official government newspaper which high-
lighted the «[. ..] dubious provision for foreign special services to invade our cyber 
space and carry out their special operations without notifying our intelligence ser-
vices».
21
 
     If we remember that a year before the two conferences of London and The Hague the 
Chinese government had already published a White Paper on the use of the Net, there is 
nothing to be surprised if Russia has decided to co-operate with China on the question 
of cyber defence and cyber sovereignty. As concerns this, the White Paper “The Internet 
in China”, published on December 8, 2010, gives us a clear explanation of how different 
the Oriental conception of the Net is, compared with the principles claimed by Western 
powers. The basic goals of China’s Internet administration, it is stated, are to promote 
general and hassle-free web accessibility, regulate the order of Internet information 
transmission, and create a market environment for fair competition. Apart from this, we 
can read that the government has the duty to curb the effects of illegal information on 
                                                          
20
 See H. CLINTON, Remarks by Hillary Rodham Clinton at Conference on Internet Freedom, The Hague, 
Netherlands, December 8, 2011, in www.youtube.com, accessed on June 10, 2018. 
21
 GILES, Russia’s Public Stance on Cyberspace Issues, cit., p. 67. 
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State security, public interests and minors.
22
 Therefore, the Administration clearly pro-
hibits the spread of information with contents subverting State power, undermining na-
tional unity, inciting ethnic hatred and secession, advocating heresy, pornography, vio-
lence, terror, thus setting up Internet security management systems with the purpose to 
prevent all types of illegal information and strengthen legal and ethical education.  
     A pivotal paragraph is the one dealing with Internet security protection, regarded as 
an indispensable requirement for State security and public interest. The statement ac-
cording to which within Chinese territory the Internet is under the jurisdiction of Chi-
nese sovereignty, thus respecting and protecting the cyber sovereignty of China, is what 
prevents Beijing from signing the Budapest Convention and what separates the Asian 
power from the way the West interprets freedom of access to the Net. On the question of 
secure information flow, despite the assertion that the Chinese government attaches 
great importance to protecting the safe flow of Internet information, at the same time 
any kind of content interpreted as harmful to Chinese sovereignty and State principles is 
strictly forbidden. The territorial unity of the nation, as well as the political supremacy 
of the Communist Party, or policies such as the so-called socialist market economy, but 
also religious and ethnic questions, must not be jeopardised by online dissent. Hence, all 
Chinese citizens, foreign citizens, and other organisations within the territory of China 
must obey the provisions forbidding production, duplication, or dissemination of infor-
mation which may: a) endanger State security, divulge State secrets, subvert State 
power and jeopardise national unification; b) damage State honour and interests; c) in-
stigate ethnic hatred or discrimination and jeopardise ethnic unity; d) harm State reli-
gious policy, propagating heretical or superstitious ideas; e) spread rumours disrupting 
social order and stability; f) disseminate obscenity, pornography, gambling, violence, 
brutality and terror.
23
 Such a policy was confirmed a few years later, at the BRICS Sum-
mit in Brazil in July 2014, when Chinese President Xi Jinping called for respect of a 
                                                          
22
 See THE INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, White 
Paper - The Internet in China, June 8, 2010, in www.gov.cn. 
23
 See ibid. 
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country’s cyber space sovereignty, claiming the right for every country to preserve its 
own information security.
24
  
 
2.  NATO on cyber defence 
 
By reading the documents issued by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation on cyber 
space, it is quite easy to realise how alternative a stance the West takes. Actually, what 
is stated in NATO papers and declarations is a plea to collaboration with EU partners on 
a broad variety of matters, such as cyber defence, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, counter-terrorism, energy security, and maritime security. On the other 
hand Russia, despite official statements on the need of a joint effort to preserve the Web 
from cyber crime, is once again seen as the main representative of a completely differ-
ent scenario, if not as an enemy trying to influence the political life of Western coun-
tries. As an evidence of this, the Heads of State and Government participating in the 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales issued a common declaration about the 
policies to pursue on several world challenges. What is remarkable is that the Alliance 
recognised that international law and the UN Charter apply also in cyber space, affirm-
ing as well that cyber defence had become part of the Organisation’s core task of collec-
tive defence, implying, on a case-by-case basis, the decision to invoke Article 5.
25
 
     As an implementation of such a statement, two years later the leadership of the 
European Union and NATO, that is to say Donald Tusk, President of the European 
Council, Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, and Jens Stol-
tenberg, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, released a joint 
declaration on the NATO-EU strategic partnership, underlining the need to boost the mu-
tual ability to counter hybrid threats, through timely information and intelligence shar-
ing.
26
 In order to foster research and technology in this field, the EU Computer Emer-
                                                          
24
 See W. JIAO - Z. SHENGNAN, Xi: Respect Cyber Sovereignty, July 17, 2014, in 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn. 
25
 See Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meet-
ing of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, September 5, 2014, in www.nato.int. 
26
 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the Presi-
dent of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
July 8, 2016, in http://europa.eu. 
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gency Response Team (CERT-EU)
27
 and the NATO Computer Incident Response Capa-
bility (NCIRC)
28
 were supposed to jointly develop their ability to innovate and cooperate 
with private industry.
29
 As we can see, in the last few years the main European and At-
lantic organisations have set up a common system to respond to cyber attacks and hy-
brid threats, which are now perceived as likewise dangerous as ballistic missile attacks 
from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. What may strike our attention most in these docu-
ments, however, is the way this updated collaboration seems to pursue the task to isolate 
Russia from the international forum, as a response to what is regarded as Moscow’s cy-
ber offensive against the West. 
     As a matter of fact, the Warsaw Summit of the North Atlantic Council of 8-9 July 
2016 represents a watershed in the most recent relations between the West and the non 
Euro-Atlantic world, in terms of strictness of positions on global security and as regards 
the sharpness of the words chosen in the following communiqué, especially towards 
what was by then openly perceived as the Russian threat to world peace and stability. 
The document deals with cyber space in paragraphs 70 to 72, stating that the Web is 
recognised as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself in accordance 
with international law. All this must be pursued through close bilateral and multilateral 
cyber defence cooperation, especially by deepening collaboration with the EU. An im-
portant passage is the one relating to the possibility to invoke collective defence.
30
 Apart 
from such a generic reference to cyber defence, the language becomes much sharper and 
more direct when Russia is involved, complaining for example that for the last two dec-
ades NATO has tried in any possible way to build a partnership with Russia, whose re-
                                                          
27
 The Computer Emergency Response Team is composed of IT security experts from the main EU Institu-
tions, with the aim to cooperate with other CERTs in the member States and with specialised IT security 
companies in order to respond to information security incidents and cyber threats.  
28
 The NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCI Agency) Cyber Security (CS) Service Line 
(SL) is responsible for planning and executing all life cycle management activities for cyber security. Cy-
ber Security incorporates the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) Technical Centre, 
providing specialist services to prevent, detect, respond to and recover from cyber security incidents. 
29
 See NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, Statement on the Implementation of the Joint Declara-
tion Signed by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the 
Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, December 6, 2016, in www.nato.int. 
30
 See NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, Warsaw Summit Communiqué, Issued by the Heads of 
State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, July 8-9, 
2016, in www.nato.int. 
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cent activities and policies have reduced stability, increased unpredictability, and 
changed the security environment. Such a statement is followed by serious allegations 
for Moscow to have breached the values, principles and commitments outlined in previ-
ous agreements, such as the 1997 Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council,
31
 and the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act.
32
 Therefore, Russia is accused of 
destabilising actions, including the ongoing illegal and illegitimate annexation of Cri-
mea, the violation of sovereign borders by force, the deliberate destabilisation of East-
ern Ukraine, and repeated violations of NATO Allied airspace.
33
 What is even worse is 
the pessimistic mood towards future NATO-Russian relations, especially after the an-
nexation of Crimea in 2014. Despite the strategic value of a partnership between the At-
lantic Alliance and Russia, the papers clearly state that at the moment the conditions for 
such a cooperation do not exist, as long as Moscow does not show compliance with in-
ternational law and its own international obligations and responsibilities. What Euro-
Atlantic Heads of State and Government blame Russia for, is the violation of the points 
expressed in the 2002 Rome Summit NATO-Russia Council, in particular as concerns 
the mutual determination to build together a lasting and inclusive peace under the obli-
gations provided in the UN Charter, the provisions and principles contained in the Hel-
sinki Final Act and the OSCE Charter for European Security.
34
  
     Trying to read this document from a Russian point of view, what might be worrying 
are probably paragraphs 40 and 41, which are not hard to interpret as a sort of encircle-
ment from the West. As an evidence of that, through the Warsaw Declaration NATO de-
cided to establish an enhanced forward presence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Po-
land, with multinational forces provided by framework nations and other contributing 
allies to unambiguously demonstrate solidarity, determination, and ability to act by trig-
gering an immediate response to any aggression. Furthermore, the Alliance accepted the 
                                                          
31
 See NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council, May 30, 1997, in www.nato.int. 
32
 See Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Fed-
eration Signed in Paris, France, May 27, 1997, in www.nato.int. 
33
 See NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, Warsaw Summit Communiqué, cit. 
34
 See NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL, Rome Summit 2002, Declaration by Heads of State and Government of 
NATO Member States and the Russian Federation, NATO Office of Information and Press, in 
www.nato.int. 
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Rumanian initiative to establish a multinational framework brigade to help improve in-
tegrated training around the Black Sea region, also increasing ballistic missile defence 
effectiveness and extending the defence building initiative to Moldova.
35
 The strategy of 
NATO on cyber security is based on the two core principles of collective defence and re-
silience, thus taking care of improving the means for sharing information and promote a 
deeper knowledge of existing threats, also providing the integration of cyber defence 
into operational planning and assistance in case of cyber attack.
36
 However, the allies 
are far from adopting a common view on the conditions in which the use of force may 
apply in case of a malicious act in cyber space.
37
  
     According to the U.S. Center for Cyber and Homeland Security, there are four main 
threats in the cyber domain: a) nation-States, as every country with a modern military 
and intelligence service has also network attack capability; b) foreign terrorist organisa-
tions, which have not fully developed a cyber-attack capability yet; c) criminal organisa-
tions driven by profit motivations, some of which are increasingly working for States 
such as Russia; d) hactivists, aiming at bringing attention to their cause.
38
 The kind of 
danger perceived as most threatening to U.S. security are thought to be those coming 
from nation-States and their proxies, in particular China and Russia. Actually, the for-
mer is said to possess sophisticated cyber capabilities and reports of the Office of the 
U.S. National Counterintelligence Executive have classified Chinese cyber activities as 
                                                          
35
 See NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, Warsaw Summit Communiqué, cit. 
36
 NATO’s legal framework is based on the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
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rising to the level of strategic threat to the U.S. national interest.
39
 As a matter of fact, 
the People’s Republic of China is accused of amassing data and secrets able to further 
support the country’s economic growth, as well as scientific, technological, and military  
capacities. As concerns the Russian Federation, its cyber capabilities are even more so-
phisticated, aiming at collecting economic information and technology to support Rus-
sia’s economic development and security. This is why the former communist super-
power has been registered as a long-term strategic threat to the United States, especially 
after signing a cyber security agreement with China, pledging both parties not to hack 
each other and to share information and technology.
40
 The Americans are worried about 
a toxic blend of crime, business, and politics in a sort of convergence between the Rus-
sian intelligence community and cyber criminals, while relations between Russia and 
the West are deteriorating more and more. As a clear evidence of this collaboration with 
cyber criminals, the Americans quote a public notice, issued by the Russian Foreign 
Ministry, advising citizens to refrain from travelling abroad, especially to countries that 
have signed agreements with the U.S. on mutual extradition.
41
 To even better under-
stand how wrecked the relations between the United States and Russia are, suffice it to 
quote what James R. Clapper, former Director of National Intelligence, reported before 
the Senate in 2016, when he stated that Russia was «[...] assuming a more assertive cy-
ber posture based on its willingness to target critical infrastructure systems and conduct 
espionage operations even when detected».
42
 
     The 2018 National Intelligence Worldwide Threat Assessment, instead, warns about 
a growing risk for some adversaries to conduct cyber attacks short of war against the 
U.S in a crisis. In particular, Russia and China are said to be posing the greatest cyber 
threat to the United States for the next years. In light of such a statement, these States 
are accused to be using cyber operations as a low-cost tool of statecraft to achieve stra-
tegic objectives. As concerns Russia, the American intelligence expects Moscow to 
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conduct bolder and more disruptive cyber operations, probing U.S. and allied critical in-
frastructures, aiming at disseminating false information via Russian State-controlled 
media to encourage anti-American political views, thus seeking to reduce trust and con-
fidence in democratic processes, degrade democratization efforts, and undermine the ef-
fort to bring Ukraine and other former Soviet republics into European institutions. On 
the other hand, China is suspected to be continuing to use cyber espionage and bolster 
cyber attack capabilities to support national security priorities. Finally, Washington ex-
perts predict the line between criminal and nation-State activity to become increasingly 
blurred as governments view cyber criminal tools as a relatively inexpensive and deni-
able means to enable their operations.
43
 
 
3. The Sino-Russian co-operation on cyber space 
 
As a response to the Western approach to cyber security and information sharing, the 
former enemies of the communist world are tightening their relations more and more, 
thus moulding an opposite vision of information security matters. Moscow’s and Bei-
jing’s policies have converged so much, that in 2015 the two giants of the East reached 
an agreement on cooperation in ensuring international security in the cyber domain. If 
we read carefully the text of this treaty, we can easily realise how Russia and China are 
always concerned about threats related to the use of such technology with the purpose to 
undermine the sovereignty and security of States and interference in their internal af-
fairs. Article two quotes the threat of using the Web for terrorist purposes, thus follow-
ing the policy pursued by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation since its foundation in 
2001.
44
 On grounds of this, the agreement authorises representatives and the competent 
authorities of the two States to cooperate in ensuring international information security 
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to investigate cases involving the use of information and communication technologies 
for terrorist and criminal purposes.
45
 
     The following year, the Chinese government issued its national cyber space security 
strategy, highlighting that national sovereignty had extended and stretched into cyber 
space. According to this statement, the Executive’s main concern is granting its stabil-
ity, seen as a precondition for national development and the happiness of the people. 
Hence, what is to avoid is the use of networks to interfere in the internal political affairs 
of other countries, inciting social unrest. An important difference with the Western ap-
proach is the focus on the moral sphere and life style with the purpose to protect the So-
cialist code of values. In light of this, the government has the duty to prevent online ru-
mours, degenerate culture, obscenity, violence, superstition and any harmful informa-
tion from corroding the physical and mental health of minors, influencing social har-
mony and stability, and misleading value orientations.
46
 A few months previously, in 
March 2016 the Chinese government had launched the national innovation portion of its 
13th Five-Year Plan, including its commitment to “Internet plus”, designed to drive 
economic growth and foster new industries by integrating web technology with Chinese 
business and manufacturing. Shortly afterwards, President Xi Jinping chaired a cyber 
security and information forum, during which he emphasized the value of the Internet as 
a tool to improve the flow of information, technology, capital, and talent, as well as 
goods and services.
47
 The Chinese national strategy is based on a series of principles, 
among which there is first of all respect and protection of sovereignty in the web do-
main, with the consequent right of any country to independently choose their network 
management method, thus formulating laws and regulations on the basis of their na-
tional circumstances to protect information systems. What strikes our attention is the 
steadfast position on the need to keep independence on cyber security policy, with the 
relating appeal that no country should engage in cyber hegemonies and use the network 
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to interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries. All countries, instead, should per-
sist in mutual respect and seek common ground while accepting differences, without 
trying to control other countries’ networks and information systems, or collect and steal 
data from other countries.
48
  
     As regards the tasks pursued by the People’s Republic of China, these may be sum-
marised as follows: a) defending sovereignty in cyberspace, thus opposing all actions to 
subvert the country’s national regime; b) safeguarding national security, thus preventing 
any act of using the network to engage in treason, separatism, incite rebellion or subver-
sion, or steal or leak State secrets, also by punishing foreign powers promoting separa-
tist activities; c) protecting critical information facilities, thus controlling also basic in-
formation networks providing public telecommunications, as well as important informa-
tion systems in fields such as energy, finance, education, scientific research; d) strength-
ening the construction of online culture to foster and practice the Socialist core value 
view; e) opposing cyber terrorism and crime, including dissemination of obscenity and 
sex; f) enhancing cyber space protection capabilities to resist cyber intrusions.
49
 In a few 
words, such a piece of legislation outlines responsibilities for service providers to ad-
dress content censorship, enforce real-name registration for Internet services, give man-
datory assistance to law enforcement, and require data residence of personal and impor-
tant data associated with critical infrastructure. Apart from this, organisations with in-
formation or systems not located in the Asian country must also review their technology 
architecture and business processes if they want to reduce the risk of being prosecuted.
50
  
     The other actor of what we may call “Web Cold War” is Russia, which views cyber 
and hybrid war as strategic tools to respond to what it regards as long-term Western 
support for regime change stretching back to the disintegration of the USSR and the so-
called coloured revolutions in the Balkans, Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Such a belief is 
testified by President Putin’s words, accusing the West of aiming at finishing Russia 
off, after the Soviet Union had collapsed. Therefore, colour revolutions are seen as the 
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equivalent of Western soft power aiming at the hard expansion of NATO and the EU. 
Hence, when the EU-Eastern Partnership was launched in 2009 for post-Soviet countries 
such as Ukraine and Georgia, Russia launched a competing Customs Union that became 
the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015, with Armenia being pressured to withdraw from 
the former in favour of the latter. In April 2008, speaking to the NATO-Russia Council at 
the Bucharest NATO summit, Putin described Ukraine as an “artificial” country and 
questioned Kiev’s right to control its Russian speaking Eastern and Southern regions, 
thus claiming as a legitimate policy Russia’s right to intervene in its neighbours to “pro-
tect” Russian speakers.51 Actually, the cyber domain has provoked a shift in Russian 
doctrine, as cyber has been turned into a means to obtain asymmetric advantage. The 
origins of such a new approach may be dated back to 2013, when the then Chief of the 
General Staff, Valeri Gerasimov, wrote an article and delivered a speech which is by 
now commonly referred to as the “Gerasimov Doctrine”. Gerasimov stated that methods 
of conducting military operations that cannot be considered purely military have 
emerged. On grounds of this, he added that the role of non-military means in achieving 
political and strategic goals had grown, and that in modern reality Russia must look to 
non-military instruments.
52
 As of December 2016 and amid Western and former Soviet-
sphere countries accusing Moscow of waging informational warfare campaigns, the 
Kremlin released its new Information and Security Doctrine, highlighting the need to 
counter propaganda, informational-psychological influence by foreign intelligence ser-
vices and recruitment efforts by terrorist organisations, and to secure computers from 
cyber espionage and cyber crime aimed at disrupting the historical foundations and pa-
triotic traditions associated with the defence of Russia.
53
 According to Stephen R. Cov-
ington, Russia’s assessment of technological inferiority has reinforced perceptions of 
strategic vulnerability in traditional Russian culture, impacting its approach to war and 
the need to invest in information and cyber capabilities. Technological vulnerability is 
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seen first and foremost as the inability to match the West’s revolutionary leaps in tech-
nological innovation for weapons system development. Thus, Russia requires a different 
approach towards this perceived Western advantage.
54
 
     Having said this, there is no need to be surprised if President Putin delivered the ba-
sic principles of foreign policy of the Russian Federation just a few months after the 
NATO Warsaw Declaration and barely a month before the Chinese published their own 
concept of national cyber security. Concerning the collaboration with Beijing, the words 
used by the Russians are practically the same as those we can read in Chinese papers. 
For example, point 28 of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation states as 
follows: «Russia takes necessary measures to ensure national and international cyber se-
curity, counter threats to State, economic and social security emanating from cyber 
space, combat terrorism and other criminal threats involving the use of information and 
communication technology; deters their use for military-political aims that run counter 
to international law, including actions aimed at interfering in the domestic affairs of 
States or posing a threat to international peace, security and stability [...]».
55
 What is 
even more interesting to highlight is probably the paragraph on the relations with NATO, 
which replies to all Western allegations. Moscow accuses the Atlantic Alliance and the 
EU to pursue geopolitical expansion, along with their refusal to implement the creation 
of a common European security and cooperation framework. The Russian Federation 
maintains its negative perspective towards NATO’S military infrastructure approaching 
Russian borders, and its growing military activity in regions neighbouring Russia, view-
ing them as a violation of the principle of equal and indivisible security. Such a stance, 
according to the Kremlin, is the reason why in the last twenty-five years there has been 
a serious crisis in the relations between Russia and the West, thus preventing coopera-
tion against global challenges and threats.
56
 On the contrary, Russia claims equitable 
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partnership with the Western alliance, on grounds of the commitment undertaken within 
the Russia-NATO Council to refrain from seeking to ensure one’s security at the expense 
of the security of other States. As concerns the relations with the former rival of the 
Cold War, point 72 reminds the goal to build mutually beneficial relations with the 
United States of America, taking into consideration that such a dialogue could posi-
tively develop only when conducted on equal footing and non-interference in each 
other’s domestic affairs.57 On the other hand, the alliance with China is strengthened 
and supposed to continue on a basis of a comprehensive, equal partnership and strategic 
cooperation, thus being turned into one of the core elements of regional and global sta-
bility.  
     
Conclusions 
 
In 2017, important decisions were reached during the G7 meetings. First of all, the risk 
of escalation and retaliation in cyber space is not to underestimate, including massive 
denial-of-service attacks, damage to critical infrastructure impairing the use and opera-
tions providing services to the public, with a possible destabilizing effect on interna-
tional peace and security and interference in democratic political processes. According 
to the Lucca Declaration on responsible behaviour in cyber space, the G7 group is 
committed to promoting a strategic framework for conflict prevention, cooperation and 
stability, recognising the applicability of existing international law to the world wide 
web. Under some circumstances, the foreign ministers of the seven world most industri-
alised countries reminded that cyber activities could amount to the use of force or an 
armed attack, thus implying the right for victim States to exercise their faculty of indi-
vidual or collective self-defence.
58
 To increase predictability and stability in cyber 
space, all States are invited to publicly explain their views on how existing international 
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law applies to governmental activities in the cyber domain, thus laying the basis of the 
wide contrast between the Western interpretation of cyber security and government use 
of the Web on one hand, and the Sino-Russian vision of cyber space on the other. The 
following month, through the Taormina Declaration on the struggle against terrorism 
and violent extremism, the G7 leaders undertook to shift the challenge to a higher level, 
with a particular focus on the cyber dimension of such a threat, urging private industry 
and service providers to develop new technologies monitoring violent behaviour on-
line. All this, the document states, must be carried out respecting the principles of de-
mocracy, safeguarding of human rights and the rule of law.
59
 
     On the other hand, the relations between the European Union and the Russian Fed-
eration have become rather unstable, as shown in an in-depth analysis on Russian di-
plomacy and foreign policy issued by the EU Directorate General for External Policies 
in 2017. According to such a paper, the idea that Russia should be recognised as a great 
power has driven Moscow’s posture on the world stage for several centuries. Actually, 
the Russians are accused of feeling nostalgia of the Cold War era, when they stood as 
one of the two superpowers. Among other things, the Kremlin’s new security strategy 
claims to increase the Russian role in the emerging polycentric world, on grounds of a 
global dangerous and volatile scenario, characterised by stiff competition for resources, 
control of markets and transport routes, as well as political influence amongst major 
powers. Therefore, Russia has not forgotten the inclination to surround itself with buffer 
zones as a protection from invasions and external instabilities, thus trying to control 
neighbouring nations, through for example a Eurasian integration process with countries 
once belonging to the Soviet Union. As a consequence of that, Russia views Western 
States and organisations as obstacles to the realisation of its ambitions.
60
 What seems 
more worrying for Brussels is the verification that seeking a strategic partnership with 
the European Union has become less prominent in Russia’s general strategy, for Mos-
cow increasingly perceives the EU as strategically less and less relevant. Hence, a part-
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nership with the EU appears less valuable than strategic convergence with China and 
other major rising powers. In addition, Russia sees the EU as a kind of a strategic con-
tinuation of the United States and NATO. This perception has been compounded by the 
fact that EU countries that are also NATO members have repeatedly opposed Russia’s 
critical positions on the Atlantic Alliance’s policy.61  
     In light of all this, cooperation prospects between Russian and Western Europe ap-
pear quite grim and will remain so should the current political circumstances persist in 
the future, despite economic and energy agreements. In addition, we can say that the old 
Cold War has moved to the Web, as in the last years the United States has been pursu-
ing a policy of neo-containment, with an approach to former Soviet satellites which is 
regarded as extremely harmful to Russian national interests. We know that threats to 
Russian security have always come from the West, from the Swedes in the XVIII cen-
tury, to the Germans in both world wars, and NATO missiles in Western Europe. There-
fore, it is easy to realise that Moscow simply does not trust the West as concerns infor-
mation sharing and cyber security principles, seeing what the Atlantic Alliance and the 
European Union condemn as a way to safeguard its right to play a global role on the in-
ternational chess board. In conclusion, the Kremlin perceives the dialogue with the 
Euro-Atlantic area as a cooperation between equal but different actors, aiming at carv-
ing out for itself a leading role in the Euro-Asian region in alliance with the Chinese gi-
ant, with which being able to extend their area of influence not only in Asia and the 
former Soviet republics, but also in Africa and Latin America, on grounds of national 
security interests and foreign policy aims difficult to conciliate with those of the West.  
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